![]() ![]() Cabin pressure was raised by manually closing the outflow valve using the Digital Pressure Control Panel (DPCP) located on the overhead panel in the cockpit. The leak check required the use of bleed air from the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) to manually pressurize the aircraft. Investigators concluded that the leak check did not follow the Aircraft Maintenance Manual procedures. Upon arrival in Cyprus, ground engineers conducted inspections which included a visual inspection and operation of the aft right service door and a cabin pressurization leak check. " This writeup was then transferred to the Aircraft Technical Log by the flight crew as "Aft service door requires full inspection." Photo of aft service door on the Boeing 737-300 Preflight Maintenance Activity The writeup stated, "Aft service door (starboard) seal around door freezes & hard bangs are heard during flt. During this flight, which was the flight immediately prior to the accident flight, the cabin crew noted a problem with the aircraft's right aft service door and made an entry in the Aircraft Cabin Defect Log. On August 13, 2005, a Helios Boeing 737-300 aircraft, registration number 5B-DBY, departed London's Heathrow airport (LHR) enroute to Larnaca, Cyprus, where it landed at 0425 local time. Photo of Helios 737-300 History of Flight Preceding flight from London to Cyprus Ultimately, this accident drove design changes to the 737 aircraft cockpit to ensure the flight crew would correctly identify and react to the cabin altitude warning. It also highlighted deficiencies in the dissemination of safety information among air carriers, particularly with regard to the many precursors to this accident. This accident highlighted human failures related to checklist discipline and served to question the airworthiness assumptions that allowed the dual use of a horn for Takeoff Configuration and Cabin Altitude Warnings. This was the result of the flight crew’s failure to correctly configure the aircraft's pressurization system prior to flight and their subsequent incorrect response to the high cabin altitude and associated warnings. The direct cause of the accident was determined to be incapacitation of the flight crew due to hypoxia. The final descent into terrain was the result of both engines flaming out due to fuel starvation after the airplane had been under automatic control in a high-altitude holding pattern in the vicinity of Athens International Airport. The flight, Helios HCY522, was a planned flight from Larnaca, Cyprus to Prague, Czech Republic via Athens, Greece. The 115 passengers and six crew members on board were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. On the morning of August 14, 2005, at approximately 1203 local time, a Boeing 737-300, registration number 5B-DBY, operated by Helios Airways, impacted hilly terrain in the vicinity of Grammatiko, Hellas, Greece, approximately 33 km northwest of the Athens International Airport. Photo of Helios 737 Helios Airways Flight 52, HCY522 Hellas, Greece August 14, 2005 Recreational Flyers & Modeler Community-Based Organizations.Critical Infrastructure & Public Venues.Certificated Remote Pilots including Commercial Operators.Legislation & Policies, Regulations & Guidance.Data & Research Subnav: Data & Research 1.Airport Safety Information Video Series.Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) Program. ![]() ![]() Airport Coronavirus Response Grant Program.General Aviation & Recreational Aircraft.Vintage & Experimental Aircraft Program.Aviation Safety Draft Documents Open for Comment.
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